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WHEN DOES CHARISMA MATTER FOR TOP-LEVEL
LEADERS? EFFECT OF ATTRIBUTIONAL AMBIGUITY
PHILIPPE JACQUART
EMLYON Business School
JOHN ANTONAKIS
University of Lausanne
One stream of leadership theory suggests that leaders are evaluated via inferential ob-
server processes that compare the fit of the target to a prototype of an ideal (charismatic)
leader. Alternatively, attributional theories of leadership suggest that evaluations depend
on knowledge of past organizational performance, which is attributed to the leader’s
skills. We develop a novel theory showing how inferential and attributional processes
simultaneously explain top-level leader evaluation, and, ultimately, leader retention and
selection. We argue that observers will mostly rely on attributional mechanisms when
performance signals clearly indicate good or poor performance outcomes. However,
under conditions of attributional ambiguity (i.e., when performance signals are unclear),
observers will mostly rely on inferential processes. In Study 1, we tested our theory in an
unconventional context—U.S. presidential elections—and found that the two processes,
due to the leader’s charisma and country’s economic performance, interact in predicting
whether a leader is selected. Using a business context and an experimental design, in
Study 2, we showed that CEO charisma and firm performance interact in predicting
leader retention, confirming the results we found in Study 1. Thus, our results suggest that
this phenomenon is quite general and can apply to various performance domains.
Broadly defined, organizations—whether entities or
institutions like firms or nation states (Hodgson, 2006)—
have leaders at their helms. What psychological pro-
cesses explain how these top-level leaders are evaluated
and selected? We advance a novel theory by combin-
ing two—inferential and attributional—psychological
explanations. Top-level leaders are selected because of
(a) how leader-like they seemand (b) the performance of
their organization, which is causally attributed
to them. Via these two signaling channels, selec-
tors have some stereotypical cues about future or-
ganizational performance. Selectors, particularly
in limited information conditions, intuitively be-
lieve that the more an individual is leader-like and/
or the better the performance of their organization,
the more likely the leader will engender good fu-
ture performance.
The two psychological processes are well explained
by current leadership theories. From an inferential
perspective, the degree to which a leader’s charac-
teristics resemble a prototypical leader imbues the
target with leader-like qualities (Lord, Foti, & De
Vader, 1984). One key quality, charisma—an attribute
idealized across cultures (Den Hartog, House, Hanges,
& Ruiz-Quintanilla, 1999)—strongly predicts leader
prototypicality per se (Antonakis, Fenley, & Liechti,
2011) and objective outcomes (Lowe, Kroeck, &
Sivasubramaniam, 1996). Another explanatory route
is that of attribution theory, which suggests that or-
ganizational performance—a presumed indicator of
a leader’s competence—determines how leaders will
be evaluated (Calder, 1977; Lord, Binning, Rush, &
Thomas, 1978; Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987). Thus, good
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performance is thought to be an outcome of effec-
tive leadership. This tendency is so deeply rooted
that such attributions are made even when they are
not warranted (Weber, Camerer, Rottenstreich, &
Knez, 2001).
Accordingly, leaders are positively evaluated if they
act leader-like and obtain good performance. A leader
doing a “good” job will be reappointed; a leader doing
a “poor” job will be replaced (Hilger, Mankel, &
Richter, 2013). Of course, observers (particularly dis-
tant ones) cannot know everything about the leader,
if organizational performance is good or poor, or
whether the leader was responsible for the perfor-
mance. Observers lack full information—yet, they
have to make a heuristic decision under conditions
of uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
The two psychological processes reflect different
mechanisms and profoundly different approaches to
understanding leadership. The first, which is leader-
centric, argues that leaders, particularly charismatic
ones, are highly influential and affect organizational
outcomes. The second, a follower-centric perspective,
states that leadership is a social construction; observers
use organizational outcomes, whether or not caused
by the leader, to decide if a leader is effective (Meindl,
1990). Current theory has not reconciled these two
processes (cf. Day & Lord, 1988; Meindl & Ehrlich,
1987). Do both matter for top-level leadership? Might
the processes “work together” in explaining leader
selection? We seek to answer these questions by
advancing a hybrid theory of leader evaluation
and, consequently, selection. We focus on top-level
leaders and how they are evaluated by selectors, be-
cause of the impact such leaders can have on col-
lectives (House, Spangler, & Woycke, 1991; Jones &
Olken, 2005).
Our contribution is threefold. First, we will rec-
oncile (a) inferences made about leaders’ character-
istics, providing indications of how effective they
may be, with (b) attributions about the performance
of the leader’s organization, providing indications of
how effective the leaders have been (see Erickson &
Krull, 1999).1 Although inferences or attributions
about target leaders have been examined extensively
in laboratory settings (e.g., Awamleh & Gardner,
1999; Howell & Frost, 1989; Rush, Thomas, & Lord,
1977), they have not been studied simultaneously or
in terms of how leaders are selected in consequential
roles. The CEO selection and succession literature
has focused on factors such as firm performance and
demographic characteristics (Datta & Guthrie, 1994,
1997), board composition and ownership (Boeker &
Goodstein, 1993), board power (Zajac & Westphal,
1996), or on understanding how new CEOs affect
strategic change in succession events (Hutzschenreuter,
Kleindienst, & Greger, 2012). Both laboratory and field
studies, however, have neglected to model how in-
ferential and attributional processes simultaneously
affect selection decisions when attributional in-
formation is unclear.
Second, apart from bridging two disparate theo-
ries, our key contribution concerns the moderating
effect of clarity of attributional information. When
performance is clearly good (or bad), leader evaluations
will ultimately be positive (or negative) largely irre-
spective of the leader’s charisma. Simply put, leader
charisma matters little if outcomes attributed to the
leader send clear signals. However, in conditions of
attributional ambiguity, where performance signals
are inconclusive, this uncertainty will spur selec-
tors to decide on the basis of inferential processes.
In other words, the charismatic leader will shine
when attributional information is nebulous.
Third, in addition to testing our theory in a more
conventional setting—the decision to retain a CEO—we
use an unconventional context to demonstrate the
general nature of our theory: the selection of a U.S.
president. This extraordinary setting provides a con-
trolled environment allowing for a direct test of our
theory, as we explain in detail in later sections of
this paper.
With respect to our contributions, it is important
to briefly differentiate attributional ambiguity from
Weberian (1947) notions of crisis, which can refer to (a)
bad organizational performance or (b) times of turbu-
lence or environmental volatility (Waldman, Ramirez,
House, & Puranam, 2001), and this irrespective of
organizational performance signals. Our focus is on
the clarity of performance signals, which concerns
the absence of a clear negative or positive organiza-
tional performance signal and does not necessarily
reflect environmental volatility. Charisma has been
shown to matter most for firm performance in con-
ditions of perceived environmental turbulence
(Waldman et al., 2001); thus, the charismatic leader
is seen as a savior for an organization operating in
a risky environment. This phenomenon is different
1 Note, we use the terms “inferences” and “attributions”
as defined by Erickson and Krull (1999) who have argued
that the terms refer to distinct decision-making processes:
Inferences concern understanding the nature of an in-
dividual whereas attributions concern the cause of an
outcome (see also Lord and Maher, 1994, who have used
the terms recognition- and inference-based processes
respectively).
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from what our theory sets out to explain. Our model
suggests that charisma will matter most for leader
selection when organizational performance is am-
biguous, irrespective of environment volatility.
In the next section, we build a general theory of
leader selection—independent of the context in
which we test it—by discussing how leaders are
evaluated from a social–cognitive perspective. We
focus on evaluations resulting from attributions on
performance cues and from inferences based on
prototypes of ideal leaders. As concerns the latter,
we argue that charisma is a key characteristic of
such prototypes and that it will likely matter a great
deal in situations of attributional ambiguity. Then,
we highlight how our theory explains leader eval-
uation (i.e., retention and/or selection) in a political
(Study 1) and in a business (Study 2) context.
EVALUATION OF LEADERS
Attributions of Leadership and Performance Cues
Building on Jones and Davis’ (1965) correspon-
dence inference theory, Calder (1977) argued that
attributions begin with observations of (a) the leader’s
behaviors and (b) their outcomes (e.g., organiza-
tional performance). The outcome is attributed to
the leader if behaviors are distinctive and not situa-
tional dependent. Thus, attributions are likely made
when both behaviors and their effects are observable;
however, departing from Jones and Davis (1965),
Calder (1977: 197) suggested that “individuals may
also rely heavily on knowledge about effects which
are associated with a person, even though the requi-
site behavior for these effects has not been observed.”
Theoretically, observers reason in a probabilistic
way; they observe an event and attribute a cause to
it, if the event is representative of the cause (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974). For example, organizational
performance is representative of the leader’s compe-
tence; good organizational performance is attributed
to effective leadership (Binning, Zaba, & Whattam,
1986; Calder, 1977; Lord & Maher, 1994). Observing
unambiguous effects is sufficient tomake attributional
judgments (Calder, 1977), and this in a heuristic way.
In the case of close leaders (an information-rich situ-
ation), judgments are probably made in a more con-
trolled way, especially when the context of the
judgment is seen as important (see Martinko, Harvey,
& Douglas, 2007).
This attribution phenomenon is general. In a study
of U.S. oil companies, CEO compensation was ob-
served to increase following rises in firm profit, even
though profits depended on oil price fluctuations,
which are mostly exogenous to the actions of any
single CEO (Bertrand &Mullainathan, 2001). Business
press articles about a U.S. airline deconstructed and
reconstructed the CEO’s image to match the evolution
of the firm’s performance (Chen & Meindl, 1991).
These attributions apply, too, in the selection of CEOs,
wherein selectors scrutinize the organizational per-
formance of the presiding CEO to see whether he or
she should remain in office. If organizational per-
formance is deemed to have been below par, outside
candidates will be considered (Hilger et al., 2013),
who, in turn, will have the performance of their
companies scrutinized (Khurana, 2002). This pro-
cess parallels what occurs in professional sports, in
which context coaches are often fired following
prolonged poor team performance.
Interestingly, organizational performance is attrib-
uted to leaders even when performance is known to
depend on exogenous factors (Weber et al., 2001).
Thus, some scholars (Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987) state
that leadership might simply be socially constructed
and does not matter for organizational outcomes. Of
course, although performance signals bias leaders’
evaluations, leaders still impact organizational per-
formance (Jones & Olken, 2005; Lowe et al., 1996).
In summary, the extent to which organizational
performance is positive (or negative) will determine
whether selectors will be positively (or negatively)
predisposed to the leader; this evaluation, in turn,
affects whether the leader is re-selected. Thus, an
incumbent leader will only be retained if perfor-
mance has been good (Hilger et al., 2013).
Hypothesis 1. Organizational performance signals
will predict leader selection
Note that we use the term “selection” in a broad
sense to include leader selection and re-selection
(for incumbents) in cases of contests or retention at
the helm of an organization or institution.
Inferences of Leadership and Person Perception
Similar to the intuitive attribution processes
described above, individuals also judge leaders by re-
lying on heuristics. The foundations of these inferen-
tial judgments are “schemas”—cognitive knowledge
structures representing a concept along with its attrib-
utes and the relations between these attributes and
other concepts (Fiske, 1995). Schemas are developed
with repeated exposure to common attributes that
become indicative of a prototype. Once triggered,
schemas require little mental effort and convey
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configural information quickly (Fiske, 1995). Hence,
individuals use slivers of information representative of
a prototype to classify a target (seeTversky&Kahneman,
1974). Only a few indicators (e.g., of charisma) are
needed to be classified under a particular label (e.g.,
charismatic). Once classified, other indicators of the
prototype, even though not observed directly, will
be associated with the target (Cantor & Mischel,
1977). This process makes for a stable memory
structure about the target on the particular label,
directs attention, guides information encoding and
memory, and influences judgments and attitudes
(Fiske, 1995).
Hence, individuals have implicit prototypes of
leaders (Lord et al., 1984). For leadership at the
upper echelons, where there is a lack of information
about what leaders are like, observers perceive leaders
in idealized ways and are susceptible to classifying
a leader following leaders’ image-building efforts
(Antonakis & Atwater, 2002). Charisma is an impor-
tant element used in leader image building; from
a dramaturgical perspective, leaders construct their
charisma via impression-management techniques and
by packaging and communicating their message to
the target audience in an attractive way (Gardner &
Avolio, 1998). Such leaders are especially good com-
municators and use framing and scripting techniques
to project vision (Gardner & Avolio, 1998); these
leaders typify what followers expect of them (Hogg,
2001), as we discuss next.
The importance of charisma for the leadership
prototype. Charisma is a “symbolic leader influence
rooted in emotional and ideological foundations”
(Antonakis et al., 2011: 376). Such leaders are ex-
ceptionally expressive and inspiring (Gardner &
Avolio, 1998) and “manifest and symbolize desired
collective values” (Shamir, 1995: 40). They typify
the prototypicality that followers seek; they are liked
and influence followers because followers identify
with them (Hogg, 2001). These leaders are able to ar-
ticulate “an ideological vision . . . [that engenders]
a sense of identity with the collectivity” (Shamir,
House, & Arthur, 1993: 585). Charismatic leaders
make extensive use of articulation and impression-
management skills (Conger &Kanungo, 1987). They are
persuasive and use image-building techniques to im-
bue themselveswith charisma (House, 1977); the use of
rhetorical strategies is the key that “shapes the charis-
matic relationship” (Gardner & Avolio, 1998: 42). Such
leaders affect their followers through the message they
deliver (Shamir et al., 1993), which stems “from non-
verbal and verbal influencing tactics that reify the
leader’s vision” (Antonakis et al., 2011: 376).
Charismatic leaders use specific strategies in
terms of what they say and how they say it. To create
emotional links with their followers, they state their
moral conviction, sort wrong from right, and com-
municate high and ambitious goals, as well as the
confidence that these can be achieved; they do this
using rich but simple descriptions that trigger
a vivid vision (Antonakis et al., 2011; Antonakis &
House, 2002; House, 1977; House & Shamir, 1993;
Shamir, Arthur, & House, 1994; Shamir et al., 1993).
Doing so requires the leader to use rhetorical tech-
niques, including metaphors, contrasts, lists, stories,
and so forth (Den Hartog & Verburg, 1997; Frese,
Beimel, & Schoenborn, 2003; House, 1977; Shamir
et al., 1994), termed “charismatic leadership tactics,”
which predict leader emergence and prototypicality
(Antonakis et al., 2011).
For example, the use of metaphors by U.S. presi-
dents is correlated with ratings of charisma (Mio,
Riggio, Levin, & Reese, 2005) andwith ratings of their
greatness by historians (Emrich, Brower, Feldman, &
Garland, 2001). In experimental settings, researchers
have found that perceptions of leader charisma and
effectiveness are strongly influenced by the leader
displaying a strong delivery style—both in terms of
vocal fluency and of non-verbal behaviors (Awamleh
& Gardner, 1999). These charismatic tactics can be
experimentally manipulated and have strong effects
on many outcomes (e.g., trust in the leader, affect for
the leader; Antonakis et al., 2011).
Thus, we expect that the extent to which a leader is
perceived as charismaticwill affect the extent towhich
this leader is perceived as leader-like and selected,
because observers have well-developed schemas that
suggest that charismatic leaders are highly effective.
Hypothesis 2. Charisma will predict leader
selection.
The ambiguity of performance signals and the rise
of the charismatic leader.Hypotheses 1 and 2 depend
on two types of information signals: performance
(i.e., outcomes) and behavioral (i.e., charismatic). We
believe that these two signals interact with each other.
The clearer the performance signal, whether positive or
negative, the less likely charisma will matter for leader
evaluation and selection. Charisma will matter less
because selectors have what they believe is concrete
evidence of a leader’s competence (or incompetence).
Theoretically, strong performance signals are
a “litmus test”; if the test is conclusive, other factors
will not matter much in the selection decision.
Whether the leader is charismatic or not is not of issue;
the only thing that matters is if the leader has “proven”
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to be successful (or unsuccessful) and deserves ap-
pointment (or dismissal). However, in conditions of
attributional ambiguity (i.e., when the signal is not
clearly positive or negative), selectors have to decide
how to weight performance signals and charismatic
leadership signals. It is in these situations, where the
litmus test is inconclusive, that charisma will matter
much. As stated by Calder (1977), situations in
which clear performance signals are unavailable are
problematic for making attributions. Theoretically,
in such situations, selectors will look to the char-
acter of the leader, because they believe, intuitively,
that charismatic leaders usually engender positive
outcome. Thus, observers will use this information
to make a judgment regarding how good the leader
probably is, or, with time, will be. In this way,
judgments of selectors will be influenced by the
extent to which the leader is charismatic, and this
inferential process is heavily weighted in decision
making when performance signals are fuzzy.
Our theory of attributional ambiguity diverts from
theories of crisis. According to Max Weber (1947),
crisis situations engender psychological distress
and followers seek a leader who can reassure them
and allay their fears; in this way, “charismatic
leadership has a salvationistic or messianic quality”
(Kets de Vries, 1988: 238). However, crisis is not
a necessary antecedent of charismatic leadership
(Shamir & Howell, 1999). Also, a crisis can be either
indicative of (a) a clearly negative signal (organiza-
tional performance is bad), or (b) a time of economic
or political volatility, or an environment that is dy-
namic, risky, and stressful (Tosi, Misangyi, Fanelli,
Waldman, & Yammarino, 2004; Waldman et al.,
2001). These two descriptions of crisis are not iso-
morphic; the former is triggered by a negative per-
formance signal and the latter by turbulence (which
may be accompanied by clear, usually negative, or
ambiguous performance signals).
Key to understanding how we differ from Weber-
ian ideas is the role of performance signals, which
will clarify who will be selected in a time of crisis.
Contrary to Weberian notions, our theory suggests
that crisis—a clear signal of bad organizational
performance—is detrimental to a charismatic leader
if the leader is thought to be causally responsible for
the crisis. Thus, the leader will be replaced by an-
other leader. However, a charismatic leader will be
selected in conditions of attributional ambiguity.
Although we agree that crisis, in some situations,
may ease the passage for a charismatic leader, our
theory focuses on what will occur when organiza-
tional performance signals are clear or ambiguous.
Hypothesis 3. The effect of charisma on leader
selection will be moderated by the clarity of per-
formance signals such that the effect of charisma
will be (a) positive and significant when perfor-
mance signals are ambiguous and (b) non-
significant when performance signals are clear.
TOP-LEVEL LEADERSHIP IN THE CORNER AND
THE OVAL OFFICES
Via an inferential–attributional framework, our goal
is to provide an integrative theoretical account and
empirical test of how top-level leaders are selected.
We expect our theory to operate in and be bounded by
conditions of high leader distance—that is, where
there is limited information on a leader because they
are physically distant from their followers, whether
due to high status differences and/or simply because
of infrequent contact between the leader and their
followers (Antonakis & Atwater, 2002). We chose two
such contexts in which to test our theory: (1) the U.S.
presidency and (2) a conventional CEO setting, using
field and laboratory data respectively.
Both political and business leadership requires so-
cial influence and organizational skills, which are in-
herent characteristics of management; in addition,
both contexts reflect leadership at top hierarchical
levels. However, at the outset, they seem to be quali-
tatively dissimilar and to entail different dynamics
with respect to leader selection or retention. Thus,
there is an important question to address: Is leadership
in the U.S. presidential context relevant to manage-
ment theory? There are specificities, explained in the
next section, which can be factored out from this
context (i.e., modeling incumbency and political
party affiliation). Therefore, we highlight differ-
ences and similarities between these contexts, and
explain how it is precisely because of these differ-
ences that we can ensure a clean test of our theory.
The major difference between the leader selec-
tion processes is that, unlike the U.S. presidency,
CEOs are not chosen through an explicit contest
(i.e., election); of course, when more than one can-
didate is being considered, it becomes a contest
(Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014). Next,
even if in a contest, CEOs are not voted in by
far-removed evaluators. Also, in political settings,
selectors (i.e., voters) are generally not held ac-
countable to anyone; however, in business settings,
selectors (i.e., boards and search committees) are
accountable to a number of stakeholders, including
investors, and they may have other preferences or
obligations that could constrain their selection
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decision. Finally, CEOs are not obliged to campaign
for reelection at set times during their tenure. Suc-
cession events in business settings are usually
planned, or triggered because of bad organizational
performance or other factors.
Despite these differences, we argue that selectors
will, at a basic psychological level, still use the same
broad decision-making mechanisms we highlight in
our model; that is, selectors care about whether the
leader is leader-like (charismatic) and whether the
leader (or his/her political party) has presided over
positive performance. Both sets of selectors have to
make probabilistic judgments in the absence of full
behavioral or attributional information. Even though
it is hard to know precisely if a CEO or U.S. president
is fully responsible for organizational outcomes, these
leaders are nonetheless seen as being responsible
for them.
We do, however, acknowledge a big difference re-
garding the “accountability” of selectors. Boards of
directors are affected by personal and professional
obligations, from sitting on multiple boards to having
common social networks, as well as other factors.
However, we think it reasonable to believe that boards
of directors will also seek to select a competent leader
who acts leader-like and has a good track record; thus,
directors will also reason via the inferential and at-
tributional paths. The context of the U.S. presidency
does not involve such accountability dynamics—they
are held constant in this context—thereby allowing
for an unconfounded test of the effects of our theory.
For instance, factors such as seniority or one’s posi-
tionwithin a given business networkmatter; however,
these factors and others cannot be easily controlled for
in a CEO context and gaining direct access to board
members for a selection study is difficult. In addition,
board members might not be fully transparent about
their preferences and obligations for the selection
decisions, and indirect measures would require
uncovering factors that may not leave any archival
traces. Thus, both contexts are fair game for our
model, and concern the initial decision of whether
an incumbent leader (or, in the case of a second-
term U.S. President, his party) will be re-selected.
In addition, the U.S. presidential election is exo-
genously determined; every four years, selectorsmust
judge the incumbent’s (or the incumbent’s party’s)
economic record and then decide whether the leader
(or the incumbent’s party) should be reappointed.
Because the event trigger is exogenous (i.e., it fol-
lows a strict cycle), there is no possibility that un-
explained variability in the trigger is correlated with
unexplained variability in economic performance
factors; therefore, the problem of endogeneity is avoi-
ded. Hence, data from this context will allow for con-
sistent estimation of the attributional and inferential
factors that predict leader selection success. In addi-
tion, the “organization” is held constant and we have
the same performance indicators available over time
for the organization (the U.S. economy). Such a re-
search setting has an advantage over observing two
(or more) candidates each associated with prior or-
ganizational performance involving distinct organ-
izations, making a direct comparison of difficult to
model.
Finally, the trigger to CEO succession usually follows
a script that has strong parallels to political leadership.
It begins with an observable decline in performance for
which the current CEO is blamed and ousted (Khurana,
2002); then comes the search for “an individual who
has served as a CEO or president of a high-performing
and well-regarded company,” and who is, ideally,
charismatic too (Khurana, 2002: 20, italics added).
Thus, although not a contest, the incumbent is jet-
tisoned on the basis of bad organizational performance
and the savior is sought as a function of performance-
and behavioral-based signals. This process has strong
similitudes to leader selection in political contexts.
To conclude, the common denominators that the
two contexts share are amenable for testing our hy-
potheses. Both CEOs and political leaders are se-
lected by individuals that use heuristic processes in
limited information conditions. Both sets of leaders
are conscious of their image because they are
closely scrutinized by stakeholders: (a) U.S. presi-
dents by voters, elected politicians in both houses of
Congress, other officials, and administrators, and (b)
CEOs by board members, investors, employees, and
customers. Like presidents, CEOs need to be con-
cerned about being reappointed; although this concern
is not cyclical, it will be prompted if organizational
performance is below par. The initial reappoint-
ment assessment of an incumbent leader is influ-
enced both by whether that leader is charismatic
and by prior performance outcomes associated with
the incumbent; when performance signals are am-
biguous, selectors will base their decision on how
charismatic the leader is.
STUDY 1
We used archival data to model the outcomes of
U.S. presidential elections from 1916 to 2008. We
combined country-level performance and incumbency
data from a well-established econometric model
with objectively measured indicators of candidates’
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charisma. The setting was such that voters lacked full
information on the actual competence and dispositions
of candidates and all the important economic-level fac-
tors associated with the candidates and their parties.
Yet, they needed to use all available information when
they cast their vote (Kelley & Mirer, 1974).
We modeled the decisions of selectors, which the-
oretically stemmed from inferential and attribution
processes via the share of popular vote received by
the candidates. That is, we assumed that evalua-
tions due to inferential and attribution processes
were reflected in voter choices. We modeled only
contenders from the Democratic and Republican
parties, choosing to exclude third-party candidates
from the model because they usually receive a very
small percentage of the total vote.
Modeling the Specificities of the U.S. Presidency to
Test the Theory
From an attribution perspective and parallel to
what we have theorized, econometric models of
voting assume that U.S. presidential candidates are
evaluated on the state of the economy (Lewis-Beck &
Stegmaier, 2000). If the economy is healthy (e.g.,
high GDP growth and low inflation, which impact
the labor market), electors reward the incumbent or
his or her party, in the case of an incumbent not
running again. If the state of economy is poor, voters
punish the incumbent, or his or her party, and vote
for the challenger. Thus, given party affiliation, term
limits, or other factors that can make for a choice be-
tween two non-incumbents, non-incumbents will be
“made guilty” or “haloed” by complicity (i.e., party
affiliation). As a striking example, and using only
country-level economic data and incumbency data
from 1916–2008, one of the most well established
econometric models, Fair’s (2009, 2010) presiden-
tial model, explains 90.1% of the variance of vote
outcomes (i.e., the two-party vote share considering
only the Democratic and Republican contenders).
This result provides strong support to the propo-
sition that attributions of leadership can be made
solely from observing the effects of leadership
(Calder, 1977).
As for incumbency per se, the Fair (1978, 2009,
2010) model suggests that its effect cuts both ways.
An incumbent has an advantage over the challenger
because of more access to “airtime,” and is more
familiar and thus more recognizable (Gaissmaier &
Marewski, 2011). However, the longer a particular
party has been in power, the more weary voters will
be of this party: The party has “overstayed its
welcome.” In other words, incumbency status will
predict (a) a higher share of the popular vote for the
incumbent nominee and (b) a lower share of the
popular vote for the incumbent party to the extent that
the nominee’s party has been in power for a long pe-
riod of time. Thus, given that we can partial out the
idiosyncrasies of the context, we are able to leverage
our context and sample in service of testing our theory
(rather than forcefully testing our theory on an ill-
suited context and sample).
Of course, partisanship matters a great deal too
(Bartels, 2000), and most voters will consistently
vote in line with their party affiliation. Consequently,
galvanizing the party base and appealing to “swing
voters”—those who do not identify strongly with
a party—also matters (Mayer, 2008). Swing voters
will, of course, also vote depending on the state of
the economy; in addition, in situations of attribu-
tional ambiguity, which the econometric model
ignores, we surmise that voters will compare can-
didates on charisma. In these situations, those who
do not have strong party identification will be un-
sure whether to reward or blame the incumbent on
the basis of country-level economic performance,
and will be more likely to consider questions such
as “Who, of the two, is likely to have the better
leadership skills?”, “Who’d make a better com-
mander in chief?”, or “Who do I like more?” Our
theory suggests that, in such situations (of attribu-
tional ambiguity), weakly or unaffiliated voters will
be swayed by the more charismatic candidate.
To recap, when performance signals are very
clear, voters will not care much about the incum-
bent’s or the challenger’s charisma; they will simply
reward or punish the incumbent (or the incumbent’s
party if the incumbent is not running again) on the
basis of the economic fundamentals. Incumbency
provides an advantage for a sitting president only if
the president’s party has not been in power in the
preceding election. Most importantly, charisma will
matter only when the signals about the state of
the economy are ambiguous. In these situations,
the contender who is more charismatic—whether
challenger or incumbent—will win.
Data and Sample
We built our model on the most recent Fair (2009)
econometric model. This model captures the attrib-
utional effects in which we are interested, while
modeling incumbency, which we extend by adding
the inferential (charisma) effects. Thus, the key
variables in our full model are (a) share of votes
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received (indicating leader or party (re-)selection),
(b) performance signal (country-level economic
performance), (c) clarity of performance signal, and
(d) leader charisma.
All data are from the period 1916–2008.We derived
a charisma score from acceptance speeches (or ac-
ceptance letters before the advent of such speeches)
by Democrat and Republican presidential candidates
at their party’s national convention. We obtained
copies of the speeches from The American Presidency
Project’s online archives (americanpresidency.org)
and from the Official Report of the Proceedings of
national conventions (1832–1952). We use these
speeches because they are delivered in similar set-
tings, allowing for a measure of comparison that
would not have been possible to attain using other
texts (e.g., debates or stump speeches). Also, a nomi-
nation acceptance speech has tomove to the “center”
of the political spectrum and appeal to themiddle-of-
the-road swing voters. Acceptance speeches arguably
constitute the single most important speech delivered
by the candidates during the election period, and
should be the speech heard or read by the greatest
number of voters (either directly or indirectly through
various media outlets); indeed, the Los Angeles Times
reported that the final nights of both the Democratic
and Republican conventions each drew more than
30 million live TV viewers in the United States in
2012 (James, 2012).
The Fair Presidential Voting Equation
Ray C. Fair’s (1978) theory of economic voting, as
well as its more recent extension (Fair, 2009), models
the vote share of a two-party U.S. presidential vote
(i.e., considering only the Democratic and Republican
contenders and excluding third parties) based on the
performance of the U.S. economy and the presidential
incumbency. Predicting the two-party vote share in
this way simplifies the testing of our theory because
we only need to model voter choices between two
candidates. For a review of the theoretical framework
of Fair’s model, which is beyond the scope of the
present paper, refer to Fair (1978, 2009).
The latest specification of the presidential voting
equation is the following model for election year t
(for the sake of consistency, we use the same vari-
able names as Fair (2010) uses):
Vt 5a01a1Gt :It 1a2Pt:It 1a3Zt :It
1a4DPERt 1a5DURt 1a6It 1a7WARt 1 et
(1)
The dependent variable is the Democrat vote share,
V. Regarding the economic variables, there is one
a short horizon variable, G, which is the growth rate
(at an annual rate) of real per capita GDP in the first
three quarters of the election year; two variables,
P and Z, cover the entire period of the current ad-
ministration up to the election. P is the absolute
value of the GDP deflator (inflation rate at an annual
rate). Z measures the number of quarters in which
the growth rate of per capita GDP exceeded 3.2% at
an annual rate; in this respect, Z can be thought of as
a “good news” variable. DPER and DUR capture two
antagonistic effects of incumbency. DUR captures
the voters’ weariness from having the same party in
power (coded 0 if either party has been in the White
House for one term, 1 (21) if the Democratic (Re-
publican) party has been in theWhite House for two
consecutive terms, 1.25 (21.25) if the Democratic
(Republican) party has been in the White House for
three consecutive terms, and so on; i.e., an addition
(or subtraction) of .25 (2.25) for each term added).
DPER captures the advantage the incumbent presi-
dent has as a consequence of being a familiar figure
(coded 1 if a Democratic presidential incumbent
is running again, 21 if a Republican presidential in-
cumbent is running again, and 0 otherwise). Because
the dependent variable is the Democratic vote share,
the variable I is used to determine the direction of the
effect of the three economic variables (with which it is
multiplied): I 5 1 if the presidential incumbent at the
time of the election is a Democrat and I 5 21 if the
incumbent is a Republican. Finally, a dummy vari-
able, WAR, captures the short- and long-term effects
specific to bothWorldWars on the national economy.
No other effects of wars are considered by Fair be-
cause no other conflicts have affected the U.S. econ-
omy in the same way. Thus, to allow for direct
comparison with the Fair presidential voting equa-
tion, we maintain its original specification. We
obtained the data for the 1916–2008 period from Fair
(2010); all data for this study are listed in Table 1.
Extending the Fair Presidential Voting Equation
with Charisma
Because wewere interested in the relative charisma
difference between two nominees, we used the cha-
risma difference score between the candidates as the
independent variable. To control for effects due to
speech length (i.e., longer speeches have more op-
portunities to use charismatic tactics), we included
the difference in the number of sentences between the
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Democrat and the Republican speeches as a control
variable. We estimated the following model:
Vt 5b01b1Gt :It 1b2Pt:It 1b3Zt :It
1b4DPER1b5DUR1b6It 1b7WARt
1b8Charismat 1b9Length1ut (2)
where Charisma denotes the difference between
the Democrat and Republican candidate charisma
scores (Cdem2 Crep). Thus, a positive value of charisma
indicates that the Democrat candidate employed more
rhetorical items than did his Republican counterpart.
Length is the difference in speech length between the
Democrat and Republican candidates (Ldem2 Lrep). We
controlled for length instead of a relative measure
(i.e., Charisma divided by Length) because the latter
does not capture the number of times that an audi-
ence is exposed to rhetorical signals. For instance, if
one speech is twice as long as another, we cannot
assume that the two speeches will have the same
impact, even if they use the same proportion of
rhetorical signals.
To test the interaction hypothesis, we extended
Equation (2) as follows:
Vt 5 g01 g1Gt :It 1 g2Pt :It1 g3Zt :It 1 g4DPER
1 g5DUR1 g6It 1 g7WARt 1 g8Charismat
1 g9Lengtht 1 g10Performance Signalt
1 g11Performance Signal3Charismat 1wt (3)
where Performance signal is defined as the ex ante
(predicted) absolute victory margin using only attri-
butional information; that is, the predictions derived
from Equation 1 (see “Measuring performance sig-
nals,” below). Performance signal 3 Charisma is the
interaction of the later variable with charisma. Thus,
the test for the hypotheses in the full specification is
a test of the following coefficients (to the extent that
the directions of the effects are as predicted):
Hypothesis 1. g1, g2, g3 5 0 (that the economic
variables matter);
Hypothesis 2. g8, g9 5 0 (that charisma matters);
Hypothesis 3.g115 0 (that charismahas a stronger
effect when performance signals are ambiguous;
that is, a positive simple slope for Charisma when
the value of Performance signal is small and
a nonsignificant slope when the value of Perfor-
mance signal is large).
We also tested whether g4, g5, g65 0 to determine
whether the incumbency variables matter.
Measuring charisma. We used an objective mea-
sure of charisma based on rhetorical tactics employed
by leaders (Antonakis et al., 2011). We did not directly
measure how charismatic the leader seems to voters
because such a measure would be biased and unavail-
able for non-contemporary leaders. We thus measure
the projection of charisma via objectively measured
rhetorical skills (e.g., see Emrich et al., 2001; House
et al., 1991) and assume the projection engendered
charisma in the eyes of observers via the psycho-
logical mechanisms we discussed.
The measure pertains to substantive statements,
framing, and vision creation, tactics that we here list
and briefly explain (see Antonakis et al., 2011 for
details). Framing and creating a vision is accom-
plished through (a) metaphors—simplify the mes-
sage, trigger an image, aid recall; (b) rhetorical
questions—create an intrigue and an interest in
knowing the answer; (c) stories and anecdotes—elicit
an image, create identification with the protagonists,
distill a message into a moral; (d) contrasts and
comparison—define the vision in terms of what it
should or should not be and focus attention on the
message; and (e) three-part lists—provide “proof” for
the arguments, focus attention, and show complete-
ness. Substantive statements, additionally, include
(f) expressing moral conviction—highlights value
systems and provides justification for the mission;
(g) expressing the sentiments of the collective—
shows leader–followers’ similarity; (h) setting high
and ambitious goals—shows ambition, aligns efforts
toward goals; and (i) creating confidence goals can be
achieved—raises self-efficacy belief. In view of their
complex semantic and syntactic structure, these
items are coded by trained human coders and not by
computer.
Because our study’s sample period goes back to
the early 1900s, there were not video and/or audio
recordings available for all the candidates. Thus, we
did not code nonverbal charisma; however, indica-
tors of nonverbal charisma (e.g., facial expressions,
body language, use of voice) correlate strongly with
the nine verbal strategies listed above (r 5 .47, p ,
.001, uncorrected for unreliability; Antonakis et al.,
2011). Leaders who are very expressive with words
are also expressive non-verbally; thus, the markers
we have used should capture charisma, broadly de-
fined. Also, because candidates use speechwriters,
another concern was that speeches might not reflect
the charisma of candidates, but, rather, that of their
speechwriters. However, even if the coded rhetoric
might, to a certain extent, reflect the charisma of the
speechwriter, nominees have an important say in
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developing their speech. Thus, ultimately, the
speech will affect charismatic inference regarding
the candidate because the candidate, and not the
speechwriter, delivers the speech (see e.g., Bligh,
Kohles, & Meindl, 2004; House et al., 1991).
Two graduate students coded all 48 acceptance
speeches included in this study. We provided ex-
tensive training to the coders on practice speeches.
To minimize biases from their knowledge of the
candidates, we masked information associated with
candidates’ identities. For example, we concealed
individual names (unless used to name something,
not someone; e.g., “the Taft Act” or the “George
Washington bridge”), years, and any mentions of
party affiliation or ideology (i.e., “Republican,”
“Democrat,” “liberal,” “conservative,” and related
terms). So as not to create a void in meanings and
confusion for the coders, we left certain references
that could allow the coders to identify a general pe-
riod in time untouched (e.g., references to the “Iron
Curtain”, “Prohibition,” or the “Vietnam War”).
Each coder independently coded each speech at
the sentence level for the presence or absence of the
charismatic items. If a candidate employed a cha-
risma item over several sentences (e.g., using a met-
aphor across two consecutive sentences), only the
first sentence was coded. We summed the frequency
of use of each charisma item to arrive at a charisma
score. The coders correlated very highly with each
other for both the Democrat (r 5 .90, p , .001) and
Republican candidate (r 5 .89, p , 001) speeches.
To ensure a maximum reliability for the charisma
score of each candidate, we used the mean score
across the two coders for analyses. The charisma
and speech length scores are included in Table 1.
We also checked whether using difference scores
was defensible (Edwards & Parry, 1993), both here
and elsewhere (see below).
Convergent validity of charisma measure. To
ensure that our scores were valid indicators of
charisma, we examined whether they converged
with theoretically similar measures, using data from
six studies: Lichtman (2012), Simonton (1988),
Emrich et al. (2001), House et al. (1991), Murphy &
Davidshofer, 2005, and Mio et al. (2005).
Data from Lichtman’s (2012) “Keys to the White
House” system were available for all contenders.
We predicted the charisma scores of Lichtman’s
model (i.e., by computing the difference of charisma
between the Democrat and Republican nominees)
using our charisma difference score and controlling
for the difference in speech length; we also used a
robust variance estimator. Because Lichtman coded
for the presence (1) or absence (0) of charisma for
both candidates, we modeled the range of scores as
an ordered probit for the values of 21, 0, and 1
(i.e., CDem , CRep 5 21; CDem 5 CRep 5 0; CDem .
CRep 5 1). Results indicated strong convergent val-
idity with this measure (n 5 24, standardized b 5
.67, z 5 2.93, p , 0.01).
For the other five studies, we only found charisma
data for the election winner (i.e., the president) and
these data were not available for the full sample
period of our study. Nonetheless, these data were
still useful, given that the measures were derived
from different methods. For these specifications, we
controlled for speech length and party affiliation,
and we used cluster-robust standard error correc-
tions (at the candidate level because we have dif-
ferent charisma scores for presidents who served
more than one term, whereas the other researchers
gave only one overall score). Our charisma measure
was significantly related to Simonton’s (1988) rat-
ings of the charisma of U.S. presidents (n 5 18,
standardized b 5 .44, t 5 2.20, p , 0.05); to Emrich
et al.’s (2001) measure of image-based rhetoric in
U.S. presidential inaugural addresses (n 5 18, stan-
dardized b 5 .56, t 5 2.58, p 5 0.01); and to House
et al.’s (1991) measure of charismatic effects (n 5 9,
standardized b 5 .59, t 5 3.16, p , .01) as well as
their measure of charismatic behaviors (n 5 9, stan-
dardized b 5 .60, t 5 3.02, p , .01).2 Note, for these
first four studies (Emrich et al., 2001; House et al.,
1991; Lichtman, 2012; Simonton, 1988), the sample
size weighted average standardized b was quite high
(i.e., b 5 .58); corrected for unreliability in our mea-
sure (Murphy & Davidshofer, 2005) and assuming
a reliability of .80 for the other measures, this suggests
that ourmeasure correlates very highly (i.e., bcorrected 5
.71) with these other measures of charisma. Thus,
there is strong evidence for the convergent validity
in our measure of charisma.
2 The zero-order correlation between Simonton’s (1988)
ratings of charisma of U.S. presidents and Emrich et al.’s
(2001) measure of image based rhetoric in US presidential
inaugural addresses is .54; thus, we estimated the models
for these two variables simultaneously (and hence gain in
estimation efficiency). Consequently, the sample size is
reduced to 18 observations for both models–the sample
for Simonton’s (1988) ratings of charisma of U.S. presi-
dents would have otherwise amounted to 22 observations
(with a convergent validity estimate of .33, p , .10). We
estimated the model with House et al.’s (1991) measures
separately (in one seemingly unrelated model) because it
would otherwise have constrained the sample size of the
other models to 9 observations.
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Finally, our measure of charisma was also related
to two measures concerned with the use of meta-
phor rather than with charisma per se, which pro-
vides a useful approximation for the validity of our
measure (uncorrected for unreliability): Mio et al.’s
(2005) measure of presidents’ overall metaphor den-
sity (n 5 26, standardized b 5 .81, t 5 5.15, p , .01),
and the same authors’ presidents’metaphor density
score for inspiring passages (n 5 26, standardized
b 5 .74, t 5 4.36, p , .01). Thus, there is strong
evidence for the validity of our charisma measure.
Stability of charisma measure. We examined if
charisma is consistent over time and thus ensured
that the acceptance speech is a good proxy of how
charismatic a contender is in general. We obtained
charisma scores for between two and four additional
speeches from a randomly selected subsample of six
presidential candidates. We examined whether the
scores derived from several speeches (n 5 27; in-
cluding acceptance speeches) resembled one an-
other across the subsample of candidates. Using
a fixed effects model with cluster robust standard
errors, controlling for speech length, and including
a dummy variable to control for the unique nature
of acceptance speeches, we found a high intraclass
correlation (r5 .33, bootstrapped SE5 .15, z5 2.14,
p , .05); and noted, too, that acceptance speeches
had significantly higher charisma scores (b 5 39.86,
standardized b 5 .67, SE 5 7.57, t 5 5.26, p , .01),
which shows the importance that candidates give to
the acceptance speech. Thus, there is some evidence
of consistency over time—particularly when con-
sidering our small sample size—and the fact that
candidates place a large emphasis on the acceptance
speech. This result provides additional evidence of
construct validity.
Measuring performance signals. For the Perfor-
mance signal measure, we used the Fair model
(i.e., Equation 1) to estimate “out-of-sample” pre-
dictions of the Democratic vote share. An out-of-
sample prediction is a forecast that does not use the
observed values for the event in estimation. In our
case, this means that, to obtain an out-of-sample
prediction for election year t, we did not use the
data for election year t to fit the model; we only used
the sample data for year t to generate predicted
estimates from the fitted model. For example, the
out-of-sample prediction for 2008 used 1916–2004
data to estimate the model parameters. On the basis
of the fitted model, we generated predictions for
2008 by multiplying the estimated coefficients of
the fitted model with the observed values for the
predictors for 2008 to obtain a forecast of V^ for 2008.
Similarly, the out-of-sample prediction for 1916
used data from 1920–2008 to fit the model. Using
the out-of-sample prediction method makes for
a very objective model test (Meese & Rogoff, 1983).
Model fitting and forecasting evaluation are sepa-
rated, and the modeler does not “cheat” by in-
cluding the observed data of a particular year to fit
the model and then predict from it.
To generate values for the variable Performance
signal, we used the absolute difference of the out-of-
sample predictions of the econometricmodel (i.e., from
Equation 1) subtracted from 50% (i.e., Performance
signal 5 jV^t 2 50jÞ. Thus, the value of Performance
signal is the predicted margin of victory when only
considering attributional processes (the economy) and
ignoring inferential processes (candidate charisma).
Values close to 0% indicate a small margin of vic-
tory, showing a mitigated view of the economic
fundamentals: performance signals are ambiguous.
As values move away from 0%, the economic sig-
nals indicate whether the economy is doing well or
not. Note that Performance signal has sufficient
variation, ranging from .24 to 14.91 (mean 5 5.02,
SD5 4.44), and that, for about half (i.e., 13/24) of the
elections, Performance signal takes on values of less
than 5%, which would qualify these elections as
close-call elections (The Washington Post, 2012)—
these are the situations in which charisma should
matter most.
As a measure of convergent validity for Perfor-
mance signal, we correlated the out-of-sample pre-
diction of the vote share with the actual vote share
received (r(22) 5 .85, p , .001; note, we exploit this
correlation later on when estimating a two-stage
least squares (2SLS) regression).
Results
Hypothesis tests. We estimated all models using
the statistical software package Stata (version 13)—
see Table 2. We first show the results of the econo-
metric model (Model 1), to which we add Charisma
and Length (Model 2). The full model includes the
performance signal–charisma interaction (Model 3)
(see Figure 1).
The results of Model 1 are the same as those
presented in Fair (2010). The regression model
predicted a large portion of the variance in the vote
share (91.15%). Adding Charisma and Length
(Model 2) improved the coefficient of determination
(to 93.48%), as did the Performance Signal and the
interaction of Performance signal 3 Charisma var-
iables (to 95.55%).
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We tested the hypotheses, using the full specifi-
cation (Model 3). Hypothesis 1 was supported; the
set of econometric variables were simultaneously
predictive of the vote share as hypothesized. The
growth variables G and Z were positive predictors
and the inflation variablePwas a negative predictor (F
(3, 12) 5 33.21, p , .001). With respect to the in-
cumbency variables, they, too, were simultaneously
predictive (F(3, 12) 5 18.07, p , .001) in the
expected direction (i.e., the incumbent variable was
positive and the duration variable was negative). The
results also support Hypothesis 2 regarding the ad-
dition of Charisma and Length (F(2, 12) 5 5.35, p ,
.05) to the model. The simple main effect of charisma
alone (i.e., when Performance signal 5 0) was
significant too (b 5 .13, SE 5 .05, p , .05). This
simple main effect suggests that, in a predicted dead-
heat election, charisma can make a very large dif-
ference to the election outcome (the standardized b is
.42). These results provide support for Hypothesis 2.
As regards Hypothesis 3, the interaction of Per-
formance signal 3 Charisma was significant (t 5
2.26, p , .05). The form of the interaction provided
strong support that charisma matters more when
performance signals are ambiguous. Holding all
other predictors constant at the means, the simple
slope of Charisma under clear performance signals
(11 SD from the mean Performance signal) was not
significant (b 5 2.05, SE 5 .04, t 5 1.18, p . .10).
However, the simple slope of Charisma under
TABLE 2
Regression Estimates (Study 1): Predicting Vote Share
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
G·I .67** .64** .71** .74**
(6.22) (6.33) (7.03) (9.90)
P·I 2.65* 2.86** 2.47 2.21
(2.31) (3.08) (1.50) (.68)
Z·I .99** .90** 1.03** 1.10**
(4.30) (4.14) (5.10) (6.23)
DPER 2.92* 2.31† 2.17† 2.17**
(2.18) (1.83) (1.86) (2.66)
DUR 23.41* 24.32** 23.96** 23.71**
(2.87) (3.70) (3.74) (4.70)
I 21.91 .39 22.09 23.64
(.85) (.17) (.89) (1.57)
WAR 5.06† 5.11* 7.12** 8.45**
(1.99) (2.19) (3.10) (4.34)
Charisma .03 .13* .19**
(1.20) (2.49) (4.88)
Length .01 .00 2.00
(1.21) (.27) (.52)
Performance signal 2.44* 2.68**
(2.19) (4.99)
Performance signal 3 Charisma 2.02* 2.03**
(2.26) (6.13)
Constant 47.38*** 48.05** 49.79** 50.71**
(77.55) (74.92) (49.33) (65.55)
Root mean square error 2.50 2.29 2.04 1.57
R2 .91** .93** .96** .95**
DR2 F test 2.50 2.78 19.15**
n 5 24. Sample period 5 1916–2008. t-statistics in parentheses. Columns 1–3 5 OLS regression models reporting unstandardized
estimates for Models 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Column 4 reports results from the 2SLS model. The DR2 F test compares the change in R2 to the
previous (constrained) model (for Model 3, DR2 F test for the interaction alone is F(1, 12)5 5.13, p, .05). The significance of the parameters
and joint tests remain unchangedwith robust standard errors forModel 3. Note, because our dependent variableV is bounded, we reestimated
the models using a fractional logit model with robust standard errors; we also estimated the models using quantile (median) regression, which
is robust to outliers, to approximate the conditional median. The overall pattern of results using these twomodeling approaches produced the
same substantive results (with higher levels of significance).
** p , .01
* p , .05
† p , .10
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ambiguous performance signals (21 SD from the
mean of Performance signal) is positive and signif-
icant (b 5 .12, SE 5 .05, t 5 2.47, p , .05).
Forecasting accuracy. To show that the model is
not “overfitted” (Roberts & Pashler, 2000), we ex-
amined the forecasting accuracy by comparing the
out-of-sample predicted values from the various
specifications to the actual vote received, and cal-
culated the absolute error (i.e., predicted less actual
value). Overall, our models (i.e., Models 2, 3 and 4;
see following text) performed substantially better
than did the Fair model (i.e., Model 1). The mean
absolute error for Models 2, 3, and 4 was 2.70, 2.76,
and 2.90, respectively, whereas it was 2.85 for the
Fair model (see Table 1).
We can also compare if the election is “called”
correctly (a practically useful outcome). Model 3
correctly identified the winner in 21 out of 24
elections; the hit rate for Model 1 was 17 of the 24.
Interestingly, and confirming our theorizing about
the importance of clear performance signals, the
actual winning margin of the correctly called elec-
tions in the cases where Model 1 was right was
Actualcorrect 5 7.30% (SD 5 3.60), with an average
predicted winning margin for this model at Pre-
dictedcorrect 5 6.58% (SD 5 4.35); however, the
actual winning margin of those elections that were
incorrectly called by this model was only Actua-
lincorrect 5 1.37% (SD 5 1.27), with an average pre-
dicted winning margin for this model at
Predictedincorrect 5 1.22% (SD 5 1.22). Thus, when
Model 1 predicts the election will be close (i.e., the
performance signal is ambiguous), it actually is
close, and this is when this model is likely to get
it wrong because it ignores individual differences in
times of attributional ambiguity (noteActualcorrect.
Actualincorrect, t 5 4.21, p , .001; Predictedcorrect .
Predictedincorrect, t 5 3.17, p , .01).
As an additional and more basic check for the
interaction hypothesis, we looked at the predictive
accuracy of Model 2 (the model without the in-
teraction but with Charisma) versus Model 1. Model
2 called 21/24 elections right, whereas Model 1 got
17/24 right (likelihood ratio x2(1) 5 8.52, p , .01).
We then compared hit rates for the 13 elections
predicted to be a close call (i.e., , 5% victory mar-
gin; The Washington Post, 2012). Model 2 got 10
correct, whereas Model 1 only got 6 correct. This
difference was significant (likelihood ratio x2(1) 5
4.49, p , .05). Overall, these results provide con-
verging evidence in support for Hypothesis 3.
Robustness checks for endogeneity. There are
two concerns with endogeneity for the estimates of
Performance signal and Charisma. First, although
Performance signal is theoretically exogenous with
respect to V (vote share), endogeneity could bias
results because we use an ex ante estimated re-
gressor that has some degree of uncertainty in it. We
thus reestimated Model 3 (referred to as Model 4 for
this analysis) using 2SLS analysis (Antonakis,
Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010). To do so, we
required an instrument—an exogenous source of
variance that cannot possibly vary as a function of
omitted causes in Performance signal or V. We used
the actual margin of victory as our instrument, be-
cause it is perfectly observed and an absolute value
of victory for either one of the parties is exogenous
to V. We therefore estimated the model with robust
standard errors “instrumenting” Performance signal
and Performance signal 3 Charisma with the actual
margin of victory, its square, and cube, as well as the
interaction of these three variables with Charisma, and
included the rest of the variables as exogenous regres-
sors (see Wooldridge, 2002, for how to instrument
for endogenous interactions). The instruments were
“strong,” the over-identification test nonsignificant
(x2(4) 5 2.53, p . .10), and the endogeneity test of
Performance signal and Performance signal 3 Cha-
risma indicated that they were endogenous with
FIGURE 1
Interaction between Strength of Performance Sig-
nals and Charisma Difference Using Model 3
(Study 1)
Note: Prediction from the fitted values of Model 3; “Perfor-
mance signals” refers to the predicted margin of victory using
only economic and incumbency data (Model 1). The simple slope
for “clear performance signals” is not significant; that of “am-
biguous performance signals” is positive and significant. The
simple slope for “mean performance signals” is not significant.
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respect to vote share (Hausman, 1978); still, because
the 2SLS point estimates (reported in Model 4,
Table 2) did not differ from the Model 3 ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimates, as indicated by
a Wald test (x2(12) 5 14.27, p . .10), we retained
the OLS estimates. All hypothesis tests were
nonetheless still supported using 2SLS, and the
interaction pattern was similar.
Second, it is possible that the charisma of political
candidates is determined by—rather than caused
by—expected or previous electoral outcomes, ren-
dering estimates inconsistent (Antonakis et al., 2010).
Perhaps the political party that has lost the previous
election, or that is more likely to lose the current
election as a result of economic and incumbency
factors, selects a more charismatic candidate to re-
verse the electoral outcome. In order to test for this
potential reverse causality, we regressed Charisma on
the predicted values from Model 1; we also regressed
Charisma on the actual vote share from the previous
election (while controlling for Length). Both results
were non-significant, indicating that charisma is ex-
ogenous to such selection effects.
Robustness check for R2. Because of the small
sample size, we checked if Model 3 did better than
chance in terms of variance prediction.We used two
Monte Carlo simulations, to see how amodel having
the same n size and k predictors would do under
different conditions. The first simulation used nor-
mally distributed random variables. For the second
simulation, we used the observed correlation matrix
of the data for Model 3, from which we calculated
the mean absolute correlation between the 12 vari-
ables. The mean correlation was .28. To err on the
side of caution, we created a correlation matrix
manipulating the mean correlation between the
variables at .30, .40, and .50. Then, we introduced
random “shocks” in each predictor by adding x*e to
each variable (where x was manipulated from .1 to
1, and where e is a normal distributed random var-
iable with a mean of 0 and a SD of 1). We crossed the
two manipulations and ran both simulations 1,000
times (for n 5 24). The highest upper boundary of
the 95% confidence interval (CI) we obtained was
.58; the lower 95% bootstrapped boundary of Model
3’s R2 was .93, significantly higher than .58 (x2(1) 5
819.16, p , .001). Given the out-of-sample forecasts
and the simulation evidence, it is unlikely that
Model 3 is overfitted.
Predicting the 2012 election (ex ante). To fore-
cast the 2012 election (prior to the election), the two
authors independently coded the nomination accep-
tance speeches of Barack Obama and Mitt Romney.
We coded each sentence for the presence or absence of
the nine charismatic tactics listed above. Obama’s
speech had 1,908 coding events (212 sentences 3 9
coding categories); Romney’s had 2,430 coding events
(270 sentences 3 9 coding categories). Agreement
statistics (Landis & Koch, 1977) on the two codings
indicated strong agreement (kObama 5 .69, SE 5 .02,
z 5 30.28, p , .001, agreement 5 94.81%; kRomney 5
.67, SE 5 .02, z 5 33.28, p , .001, agreement 5
96.63%). We obtained very similar findings when
combining both speeches and when only examining
agreement for each of the 9 coding categories. We
therefore averaged the final scores of the coders.
Obama received a score of 177.5; Romney’s was 131
(charisma difference 5 46.5).
We used forecasts of economic data from approx-
imately two months and two weeks before the elec-
tion (Fair, 2012); we reported predictions for Models
1 and 3 from two weeks before the election (sub-
stantive projections for two weeks and two months
prior were the same). Model 1 predicted that Obama
would lose the popular vote with 49.05% (SE5 1.76,
z 5 27.81, p , .001, 90% CIs 45.97 to 52.13). Evi-
dently, the election was too close to call on the basis
of this model, as some commentators noted (New
York Times, 2012), reflecting the then mitigated
view of the economy. We used the Model 1 pre-
diction to compute the value of the Performance
signal (i.e., |49.05097–50%|5 .94903%) for Model
3. This model showed that Obama would win
55.50% of the two-party vote (SE5 2.88, t5 19.25, p
, .001, 90% CIs 50.37 to 60.64). We tested whether
55.50% differed from 50%; this result suggested
that it was unlikely that Obama would lose this
election (F(1, 12) 5 3.65, p 5 .08). Model 4 (2SLS)
predicted 57.79% for Obama (F(1, 12) 5 13.59, p ,
.001 for n from 50%), who actually received
51.96% of the two-party vote.
Brief Discussion
Controlling for the idiosyncrasy of the context of
the U.S. presidential election, results of Study 1 sug-
gest that, when performance signals are ambiguous,
leaders are selected on the basis of how charismatic
they are. However, when performance is clearly
positive (or negative), incumbents or their parties
are rewarded (or punished) at the next elections.
Although the effects of charisma were quite strong,
they should be lower-bound estimates to the extent
that politicians face intense competition before be-
ing nominated by their party to run for the presi-
dential race.
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STUDY 2
Although our findings from Study 1 made a rela-
tively strong case for external validity, we could only
assume that inferential and attributional processes
drove these results. In Study 2, we used an experi-
mental design to directly test the effect of these two
psychological processes. Using realistic stimulus
materials, we tested whether our theory explains
retention decisions about an incumbent CEO.
Materials and Procedure
We designed a TV business report, Business Line,
portrayed by actors and professionally produced to
provide an ecologically valid context within which
to manipulate information about a company’s per-
formance and the charisma of its CEO. We asked
participants to watch the newscast, which profiled
a fictitious U.K.-based company called BlueTech.
The news anchor introduced the report by stating
that there were recent increased trade volumes in
the firm’s stock, and that investors were wondering
whether to buy, hold, or sell their stocks. He then
spoke to a reporter from the London Stock Ex-
change about BlueTech’s stock price, who, in turn,
conveyed analysts’ recent recommendations. The
anchor then read a statement from the CEO of
the firm regarding recent happenings, and then
interviewed a former employee (a financial ana-
lyst) of the CEO.
Given the focus of the newscast, we manipulated
CEO charisma (high versus low) and firm perfor-
mance signals (either clearly good, ambiguous, or
clearly poor), resulting in a 2 3 3 between-subjects
experimental design. We thus created six versions
of the stimulus video—with each version of the video
lasting approximately four minutes (e.g., for the
charismatic CEO condition with good company
performance, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v5zN1RPthANFA). We hosted the videos on a pri-
vate YouTube channel and embedded them in
Qualtrics. Participants only accessed one condition.
After watching the newscast, we asked participants to
first imagine that theywere on the board of directors of
the company and then to vote on whether the current
CEO should be reappointed or replaced; it was this
decision that we modeled as the selection decision.
Participants
Our usable sample was 717 U.S. participants
(47.84% women) recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk service. These participants were thoroughly
screened on appropriate control questions and mem-
ory checks regarding the content of the videos (see
Mason & Suri, 2012), and were on average 32.65 years
old (SD 5 11.45). They represented all 20 industries
listed in the North American Industry Classification
System (United States Census Bureau, 2013) and all 50
states. Most (58.17%) had a received a college degree;
31.94% occupied at least a managerial position, and
42% of participants owned stocks or mutual funds.
Manipulated Variables
CEO charisma. We manipulated CEO charisma
in three ways: (1) directly through the CEO state-
ment read by the anchor, in terms of how many
charismatic rhetorical tactics were used (i.e., six
versus none; note that both versions of the CEO
statement had the same number of sentences and
words); (2) indirectly via how others (in this case,
the news anchor) described the leader; and (3) in-
directly through descriptions about the CEO in an
interview given by a former employee of the CEO
(e.g., Bligh, Kohles, & Pillai, 2011; Meindl, 1990).
Firm performance signals.We manipulated firm
performance through (a) presenting stock price
over the last quarter on a graph where it was either
increasing by about 8%, decreasing by about 8%,
or being almost constant (ambiguous signal); (b)
analysts’ recommendations (buy, hold, sell); and
(c) the recommendations of the finance specialist
interviewed on the show (buy, hold, sell).
Manipulation Checks
To verify participants’ perceptions of CEO cha-
risma, we used the Multifactor Leadership Ques-
tionnaire’s (MLQ’s) idealized influence (attributes),
idealized influence (behaviors), and inspirational
motivation scales (Avolio, Bass, & Jung, 1995). We
measured leader effectiveness with the MLQ’s effec-
tiveness scale. Cronbach’s a reliabilities of the four
scales were .91, .89, .94, and .89. We then regressed
each of the scales on the respectivemanipulated factor
(note: all F tests below are heteroscedastically robust).
Results showed that, for idealized influence (attrib-
utes), the mean of the charismatic CEO condition was
higher than that of the non-charismatic one (mean 5
2.88, SD 5 .83 versus mean 5 1.06, SD 5 .77, model
F(1, 715)5 928.10, p, .001, R25 .57). The results for
idealized influence (behaviors) (mean5 2.70,SD5 .83
versus mean 5 1.23, SD 5 .82, model F(1, 715) 5
572.24, p, .001, R25 .44) and inspirational motivation
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were similar (mean 5 3.43, SD 5 .72 versus mean 5
1.21, SD 5 .90, model F(1, 715) 5 1345.96, p , .001,
R2 5 .65). For effectiveness, the means of the three
conditions differed as a function of performance cues
(meannegative 5 1.51, SD 5 .90, meanambiguous 5 1.79,
SD 5 1.08, meanpositive 5 2.53, SD 5 .94, model
F(2, 714) 5 73.65, R2 5 .16; contrast F(2, 714) 5
55.29, p , .001, all p levels Bonferroni adjusted).
These results suggest that the manipulations had
their intended effects.
Results
Using a linear probability model (LPM) with
a heteroscedastically robust estimate of the vari-
ance, we regressed the binary variable—reflecting
whether the CEO should be reappointed—on the
manipulated variables Charisma and Performance
cues and the interactions (the omitted category was
Ambiguous Performance cues). We used an LPM
instead of a probit regression because the former is
a consistent estimator of binary outcome models
having marginal effects isomorphic to the observed
coefficients (Moffitt, 1999); predicted probabilities
and differences in marginal effects using a probit
regression nonetheless gave the same results. We
probed the interaction effects using post-estimation
tests (e.g., testing differences in predicted probabil-
ities), which we undertook using the delta method.
Table 3 presents our results.
The regression model predicted CEO reappoint-
ment. The effects of Performance cues were signif-
icant in the full model (F(2, 711) 5 53.30, p , .001),
and main effects contrasts showed that negative
cues significantly decreased the likelihood of CEO
reappointment, as compared to ambiguous cues
(F(1, 711)5 12.39, p, .001); likewise, positive cues
significantly increased the likelihood of leader
reappointment with respect to ambiguous cues
(F(1, 711) 5 91.99, p , .001). These results provide
strong support for Hypothesis 1. In addition, the
main effect of Charisma was significant too in
the full model (F(1, 711) 5 82.29, p , .001), as was
the main effect contrast (F(1, 711) 5 152.95, p ,
.001), providing strong support for Hypothesis 2.
The Charisma 3 Performance cues interactions
were jointly significant (F(2, 711) 5 5.46, p , .01).
Compared to the omitted category, the coefficient of
Charisma 3 Negative Performance cue was lower,
though not significantly so; the Charisma3 Positive
Performance cue coefficient was significantly lower.
A more powerful test using a linear combina-
tion showed that the average coefficient of the
two clear performance signal conditions each
interacting with charisma was significantly lower
than the omitted category (b 5 2.18, SE 5 .07, t 5
2.76, p , .01). This finding provides strong support
for Hypothesis 3a: the effect of charisma on leader
reappointment is significantly positive and higher
than when performance signals are ambiguous.
TABLE 3
Regression Estimates (Study 2): Predicting CEO Retention
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Negative cue 2.13** 2.14*** 2.08
(2.97) (3.45) (1.51)
Positive cue .36*** .35*** .47***
(8.87) (9.54) (8.17)
Charisma .39*** .38*** .50***
(11.27) (12.34) (9.07)
Charisma 3 Negative cue 2.13
(1.62)
Charisma 3 Positive cue 2.24**
(3.30)
Constant .47*** .36*** .29*** .24***
(14.94) (14.23) (9.42) (6.35)
R2 .17*** .15*** .31*** .32***
DR2 F test 5.46**
n5 717. Robust t statistics in parentheses. Columns 1–4 report unstandardized estimates for linear probabilitymodel for models predicting
the selection decision. Change in R2 is for comparing models in Columns 4 and 3.
*** p , .001
** p , .01
* p , .05
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We probed the interaction by generating pre-
dicted values (Figure 2). Unexpectedly, and as also
shown by the main effect result, Charisma had
a significant effect on leader selection in both clear
performance signal conditions: the difference in pre-
dicted probabilities between Conditions 2 (.53) and
1 (.16) was significant (DCond. 2–1 5 .37, SE 5 .06, t 5
6.56, p , .001), as it was too between Conditions
6 (.96) and 5 (.70) (DCond. 6–55 .26, SE5 .05, t5 5.65,
p , .001). Of course, the difference in Conditions
4 (.74) and 3 (.24) was significant also (DCond. 4–35 .50,
SE5 .06, t5 9.07, p, .001). As indicated previously,
the effect of Charisma on selection in the ambiguous
performance signal condition was significantly higher
than that in the other two conditions (i.e., DCond. 4–3.
(DCond. 2–1 1 DCond. 6–5)/2, F(1, 711) 5 7.63, p , .01;
note,
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
7:63
p
5 the t statistic of 2.76 listed in the
preceding paragraph).
Using a more fine-grained analysis, we tested if
the predicted probabilities differed from .50 (i.e., a
random choice). In all conditions save one (Condi-
tion 2), the difference of the predicted probability
from .50 was significant (Bonferroni-adjusted tests).
Thus, even though charisma did help the leader in
Conditions 2 versus 1, it still did not help the leader
enough. These results provide some support for Hy-
pothesis 3b; namely, that charisma has an insufficient
(albeit a positive) effect on leader selection when
performance signals are negative; however, contrary
to what we expected charisma does have a positive
effect on selection when performance signals are
positive, though the effect is comparatively smaller
than in the ambiguous condition.
Finally, our “litmus test” argument suggested that, in
Conditions 1 and 2, the leader should not be reap-
pointed; the predicted probability across these con-
ditions was .32 (, .50; F(1, 711) 5 28.79, p , .001).
Similarly, in Conditions 5 and 6, the leader should be
reappointed; predicted probability across these two
conditionswas .83 (. .50;F(1, 711)5 251.61,p, .001).
In addition, our theory also suggests that Conditions
1, 2, and 3, characterized by negative performance
signals or no charisma in the presence of ambiguous
performance signals, should have a detrimental effect
on leader selection, as compared to Conditions 4, 5,
and 6. These latter conditions have positive perfor-
mance signals or a charismatic leader along with am-
biguous performance signals. The linear combination
of estimators showed that the mean predicted proba-
bility across conditions 1, 2, and 3 (i.e., .31) was sig-
nificantly below .50 (F(1, 711) 5 69.91, p , .001). The
mean predicted probability of Conditions 4, 5, and 6
(i.e., .80) was significantly above .50 (F(1, 711) 5
213.79, p , .001). Moreover Probability(Cond. 1, 2, 3) ,
Probability(Cond. 4, 5, 6) (F (1, 711) 5 56.73, p , .001).
These results provide further support for Hypothesis 3.3
Robustness Checks
We checked for the effect of job level because
employees at lower levels may not understand the
dynamics of top-level leadership, market indicators,
or investment issues. Thus, we interacted all the job-
level dummy variables (i.e., k2 1) with performance
cues, charisma, and the performance cue–charisma
interactions; the main effect of job level as well as
the interaction coefficients of job-level remained
insignificant (F(20, 691) 5 1.35, p . .10).
FIGURE 2
Interaction between Performance Signals and
Charisma (Study 2)
Note: Estimates are from a linear-probability model with het-
eroscedastic-robust estimate of the variance. Probit model pre-
dicted probability and marginal difference were the same as
above. Error bars are 95% CIs for the prediction. Numbers at
prediction points are labels for the six experimental conditions.
3 We also asked participants how they would apportion
a $1,000 investment between BlueTech stock and low-risk
government treasuries. Charisma had the greatest effect
under conditions of attributional ambiguity. With a non-
charismatic leader, subjects allocated 20.27% of their
monies to company stock; with a charismatic leader the
allocation was 30.58% (i.e., 50.89% higher). There was no
effect of charisma in the positive performance signal
condition; however, charisma had a strong effect in the
negative performance signal condition, increasing the al-
location by 42.10% (from 13.17% to 22.75%). Participant
job-level did not affect findings.
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Brief Discussion
Experimental evidence, using high-fidelity video
material, provided further evidence that charisma
matters much more in conditions of attributional
ambiguity than in conditions in which performance
signals of the leader’s organization are clearly posi-
tive or negative. This finding suggests that similar
psychological mechanisms underlie the evaluation
and selection of top-level leaders, whether in the
political or business arena.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our results demonstrate that charisma’s effect is
most evident when performance signals are ambig-
uous; that is, inferential processes matter most in
conditions of attributional ambiguity. Applied to
the first context in which we tested our model, the
U.S. presidency, our results show that the charisma
of political candidates matters and significantly
improves the prediction of the Fair model, particu-
larly when performance signals are unclear (i.e., in
predicted close-call elections). We replicated these
results using an experimental design in a business
context, showing that reappointment of a CEO for
participants acting as board members depended
both on attributional and inferential process; the
latter, in particular, mattered most when perfor-
mance signals were ambiguous. Participants in the
role of investors reacted similarly, which suggests
that decision mindsets for selection and investment
choices are similar.
The experimental results showed that charisma
increased the likelihood of CEO reappointment across
all performance conditions. Although charisma mat-
ters most in ambiguous performance conditions, our
expectation that it would not matter under clear per-
formance signals was not supported; charisma mat-
tered, though to a lesser degree. Moreover, following
our “litmus test” argument, we found that clear neg-
ative performance signals significantly reduced the
CEO’s chances of reappointment. When performance
signals were clearly positive, the CEO’s chances of
reappointmentwere significantly increased. Although
our model offers a refined view allowing us to make
predictions about leader selection when inferential
and attributional signals are not pointing in the
same direction, it seems that a leader positively (or
negatively) assessed through both inferential and
attributional routes will be more (or less) desirable
than one who is only positively (or negatively)
assessed through just one of these two routes.
In the case of high-level leaders who are distant
from observers, our results underscore the impor-
tance of observer category-based information pro-
cessing using markers of charisma. Indeed, it is
through effective image-building and discourse that
leaders communicate their vision, but also build an
aura about themselves that is inextricably bound to
the vision. Our results also partly reconcile theories
claiming leadership is an attribution versus those
claiming that leaders matter. Leaders do have a role
in affecting organizational performance, as field
experiments manipulating leadership have shown
(Antonakis et al., 2010). The halo effect from per-
formance cues is not just illusionary. Our study
cannot speak to this part of the argument because
we cannot discern if top-level leaders matter for
country (or firm) performance; still, we know there
is strong causal evidence indicating that leaders can
even affect country-level economic performance
(Jones & Olken, 2005). Interestingly, and based on
findings from Study 2, the coefficients of the dummy
variables of cue on ratings of three MLQ charisma
scales was significant (x2(6) 5 30.36, p , .001),
taking the mean R2 across the equations from .55,
when only the charisma dummy was included, to
.59. Yet, the simultaneous linear combination of
cues was insignificant (b 5 .20, SE 5 .15, z 5 1.33,
p . .10), and that of manipulated charisma was
higher (b 5 1.76, SE 5 .08, z 5 21.40, p , .001) and
significantly so. Thus, the “romance bias” on ratings
of leadership in our data was minimal. Coupled
with the results of the CEO decision choice, our
findings show that something “in” the leader affects
evaluations beyond performance cues, which, in
turn, matters much for leader selection when per-
formance signals are clear. If selectors are unsure
about how well an organization is doing, they will
infer how competent its leader is based on how
charismatic that leader appears to be.
Our findings also shed light on charisma per se in
situations that may or may not be characterized as
a crisis. As we argued, attributional ambiguity is not
necessarily reminiscent of a crisis, and such situations
do not necessarily give rise to charismatic leaders.
The phenomenon we have identified is something
unique, and could contribute to advancing our un-
derstanding of leadership and other phenomena in
which performance is evaluated: for example, work or
interview performance is a situation wherein a target
sends signals to an evaluator via attribution and in-
ferential channels. How these signals are pondered
should largely follow our theorizing—inferential sig-
nals will matter much when attributional signals are
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ambiguous. Consider the case of hiring recently
minted PhDs for faculty positions: Because many
applicants may not have a well-developed publi-
cation record (i.e., performance signal), an impor-
tant part of the selection decision will be based on
how they sell themselves in the job talk and in-
terview, which will rely on factors such as their
charisma and communication skills, declarative
knowledge of the field, and so forth. Of course, those
that have a demonstrated publication record (or
a bad record) will have an advantage (or a disad-
vantage) if they are charismatic too (or regardless of
their charisma).
These findings, applied to leadership, also have
important practical implications for leaders—who
should project strong charisma in times of attribu-
tional ambiguity, and also associate or dissociate
themselves from performance signals depending on
whether the signals are positive or negative—but also
for evaluators, who should carefully consider whether
they are correctly pondering inferential and attribu-
tional information. Evaluators could be unduly af-
fected by charismatic targets in situations in which
performance-based information is ambiguous. Thus,
it behooves evaluators to try to obtain concrete in-
formation about targets’ true competence.
Our results should apply to situations in which
top leaders are evaluated and information on prior
performance and leader prototypicality is available.
For example, when boards of directors select CEOs,
they usually will have a shortlist of candidates along
with information on (a) how the firm they managed
performed, as well as (b) how charismatic they are
(from personal observation and from the reports of
others who have seen, heard, or read about the
CEO). Thus, although there is no direct contest,
several candidates may be considered and the in-
ferential and attributional dynamics we identified
will surely play a role in the selection decision.
There are other situations to which the model
would apply; for example, in how top-level leaders
are selected by a contest for associations or pro-
fessional bodies (here, performance signals might
not be economic but outcomes such as the evolution
in the number of members). The model could also
be extended to cases where more than two candi-
dates are vying for office.
Reflections on U.S. Presidential Leadership
Given the unique context of Study 1, our theory
not only benefitted from studying political leaders,
but it can also help explain how political leaders are
judged. For example, our results challenge the pre-
vailing wisdom regarding Obama’s victory in the
2008 U.S. presidential election—apparently, Obama
won because of his charisma, as suggested too by
scholars (e.g., Bligh & Kohles, 2009). We disagree: If
we estimate Model 3 for the case of a 2008 race in
which a Democrat president had been in office for
the two previous terms ceteris paribus (i.e., we re-
verse the incumbency record for the two past terms),
we would predict a Republican victory (35.08%
Democrat vote share). Similarly, for the case of a 2008
election for which the economic conditions had been
very good ceteris paribus (i.e., inputting values of our
model economic variables one standard deviation
above the sample mean), our model again predicts
a Republican victory (42.01% Democrat vote share);
Obama’s charisma would not have shifted the bal-
ance. In any case, the econometric model (Model 1)
predicted a Democratic victor in 2008 while ignor-
ing the charisma difference of the candidates. The
economic signals did suggest—in a relatively strong
way—a Democratic margin of victory of 5.78%
(which is slightly above the mean of the predicted
margins of victory for Model 1). So, despite Obama’s
charisma surplus, these models suggest that Obama
did not win because of his charisma but partly be-
cause of the macroeconomic performance con-
ditions in which the election was contested.
Still, charisma makes a large difference in close-
call elections (e.g., 2012). Interestingly, the majority
of the polls had Romney ahead for most of October
2012. The economic model suggested that it would
be close election (and that Obama would lose). The
economic conditions were mitigated and sent am-
biguous signals: The economy was growing, but not
strongly, and inflation was low. It appears that the
reason why Obama defied political gravity and won
the election was because he had an incumbent ad-
vantage, and because he was more charismatic than
Romney was.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Our model can be extended for any general case
where evaluators evaluate (or select) using attribu-
tional and inferential decision processes. Thus, we
hope to see studies that can obtain data on inferential
and attributional mechanisms to predict CEO or po-
litical successions using field data, particularly given
the limited sample size we had in Study 1. Experi-
mental studies should also consider modeling
business situations that include more than one
candidate vying for a position of CEO—for example,
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an incumbent CEO and an apparent “challenger”
(i.e., one who is being considered for the incum-
bent’s position). Other interesting designs could
include manipulating objective leader expertise and
responsibility in performance outcomes.
With regard to boundary conditions, national
culture, which affects the aforementioned psycho-
logical process (Morris & Peng, 1994), should mod-
erate the model, as could other contextual factors
(Liden & Antonakis, 2009). For instance, “close”
observers might not use heuristics much. Yet, it is
hard to get close to top-level leaders. Although
boards of directors, who select CEOs, might decide
in a more individuating fashion, they still do not
work on a day-to-day basis with CEOs, and part of
the information they get on the CEO is staged (in
board of directors meetings, shareholders addresses,
etc.). They also receive information about the CEO’s
performance indirectly (accounting reports, share
prices, etc.). In addition, boards may also anticipate
what distant outsiders such as shareholders and
analysts—who are affected by CEO charisma (Fanelli,
Misangyi, & Tosi, 2009; Flynn & Staw, 2004)—will
expect of a CEO. Director decisions could, therefore,
be partly explained by our model.
CONCLUSION
We extended established leader evaluation and
selection paradigms by fusing two distinct theories.
We tested the model in a political as well as a stan-
dard business context. Through the lenses of attri-
butional and inferential processes, we proposed that
selectors evaluate leaders based on prior organiza-
tional performance for which these leaders are
thought to be causally responsible. However, we
showed too that selectors use information on leader
prototypicality, charisma, in conditions of attribu-
tional ambiguity. Such mixed models should pro-
vide better explanations as to why leaders are
selected, and might prove useful in other perfor-
mance domains.
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